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Spatial Aspects of Trade Liberalization in Colombia:  






♣, Geoffrey. J. D. Hewings





Abstract. This paper offers some preliminary steps in the marriage of some of the theoretical foundations of the 
new economic geography with spatial computable general equilibrium models.  Modeling the spatial economy of 
Colombia using the traditional assumptions of CGE models makes little sense when one territorial unit, Bogotá, 
accounts for over one fourth of GDP and where transportation costs are high and accessibility low, compared to 
European or North American standards. Hence, handling market imperfections becomes imperative as does the 
need to address internal spatial issues from the perspective of Colombia’s increasing involvement with external 
markets. The paper builds on the CEER Model, a spatial CGE model of the Colombian economy; non-constant 
returns and non-iceberg transportation costs are introduced and some simulation exercises are carried out. The 
results confirm the asymmetric impacts that trade liberalization has on a spatial economy in which one region, 
Bogotá, is able to more fully exploit scale economies vis-à-vis the rest of Colombia. The analysis also reveals the 
importance of different hypotheses on factor mobility and the role of price effects to better understand the 
consequences of trade opening in a developing economy. 
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Colombia was late in its efforts towards the integration of the country in the global network,
1 as 
was the case of most Latin American countries until the 1990s.  Among the measures adopted 
in the trade reforms, initiated in the late 1980s, the restructuring of the tariff schedule played an 
important role.  Even though some tariffs were reduced drastically, it has been argued that there 
are still areas where further structural reforms are needed in Latin America, including scaling 
back remaining high tariffs.
2  However, the modeling of changes of trade policy in Colombia 
has always neglected the regional dimension.  To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to look 
at the spatial consequences of trade liberalization in Colombia, from a general equilibrium 
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perspective.
3  At the national level, there have been several attempts to evaluate the impact of 
trade liberalization on the overall economy.  This literature has been stimulated by the free trade 
agreement, FTA, which the country has been negotiating with the United States since 2004.  
According to Toro et al. (2006), these studies concluded that there will be an increase in the 
trade deficit after the FTA’s application, while the economy’s growth rates, depending on the 
model used, range between 1% and 4%, but the fiscal cost would not be very large.
4   
 
Other authors are less optimistic about the impact of trade liberalization on the economy’s 
performance.  For instance, Ocampo et al. (2004) estimated the short-run (fixed capital stocks) 
effects of a uniform 50% decrease in tariff rates showing a positive performance of the 
economy: real GDP increased by 0.27%.
5  
 
However, with the exception of Ocampo et al. (2004), who explored the effects of 
protectionism on the distribution of income between urban and rural households, no attention 
has been directed to differential regional impacts.  Since Colombia exhibits huge differences in 
the development of its regions, it is important to evaluate the spatial impacts of trade policies.  
We explore in this paper a cost-competitiveness approach, based on relative changes in the 
sectoral and regional cost and demand structures, to isolate the likely spatial effects of further 
tariff reductions in Colombia. 
 
We found considerable differences in the short-run and long-run impacts.  While, in the short-
run, structural constraints impose a spatial trap that leads to more concentration, in the long-run 
factor, mobility enables spatial re-location of production in a way that regional disparities tend 
to diminish.  Long-run results using the spatial CGE approach can reconcile theoretical 
predictions based on recent economic geography models with empirical applications to real 
economies.  In summary, such results show that the openness of the Colombian economy leads 
to a reduction of Bogotá’s primacy and greater regional specialization, as suggested by 
Krugman and Elisondo (1996). 
 
The paper is organized as follows; the second section provides a description of the regional 
setting in Colombia, highlighting spatial inequality in the country.  Following this, we discuss in 
section 3 some of the theoretical and empirical literature that attempts to address spatial aspects 
of trade liberalization.  Section 4 presents the model used in our trade policy simulations.   
Section 5 presents and discusses the short-run and long-run impacts of the tariff reduction 





                                                 
3 One pioneer work using a multiregional CGE model for Colombia is Iregui (2005). This paper quantifies the 
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are DNP (2003), Botero (2004),  and Marin and Ramírez (2005). Other authors studying the effects of trade 
liberalization on the Colombian economy with the same methodological approach are Light and Rutherford (2003), 
Esguerra et al. (2004), and Vaughan (2005).   
5 The CGE model was calibrated for 1997. Trade Liberalization in Colombia 
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2. The Regional Setting 
 
The spatial distribution of economic activity in Colombia can be gauged through the analysis of 
the evolution of the gross departmental income.
6  According to Bonet and Meisel (2006), the 
main feature is the dominance of Bogotá.  The national capital showed a growing share in the 
national gross income, from 30% in 1975 to 36% in 2000.  Additionally, Bogotá’s per capita 
gross income was, on average, more than twice national mean.  Bogotá’s supremacy became 
more evident during the 1990s, when there was a bi-modal distribution with Bogotá located in 
the upper side and the rest of the country in the lower one.  What can be observed is that some 
departments that used to be above the national average such as Antioquia, Atlántico, and Valle, 
moved closer to the mean during the 1990s.  As a result, these departments converge to those 
territorial entities that were below the national average.  Finally, another element is the 
persistence in the disparities during all the 25 years studied; Bogotá is always on top of the per 
capita gross income ranking, while the departments located in the periphery occupying the last 
positions (Caquetá, Cauca, Cesar, Córdoba, Chocó, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Magdalena, 
and Sucre).  
 
In accordance with their share in gross national income, the territorial entities may be grouped 
into four categories.  In the first stands Bogotá, this generated more than a third of the total 
gross income. The second group is made up of Antioquia and Valle, which registered shares 
that oscillate between 10 and 15%, with a descending tendency during the period.  The third 
group is composed of departments which maintained their shares at a level close to 5%: 
Atlántico, Cundinamarca, and Santander.  The rest of the departments registered shares at rates 
of less than 3%, with a number of extreme cases like Caquetá, Chocó, La Guajira, and Sucre, 
which registered rates of less than 1%.  With the exception of Bogotá and the New 
Departments, the territorial entities showed decreasing or relatively stable trends.  Bogotá of 
course accounted for the largest share (see Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1. Departmental Share in GNI, 2000 
                                                 
6 Colombia is politically divided into nation, departments, districts, and municipalities. The nation is divided into 
the departments which are subdivided into municipalities. There also exist districts which are municipalities with 
higher territorial status.   Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 
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Source: Bonet and Meisel (2006). 
 
To provide an idea about the strength of the linkages in the Colombian economy, from a spatial 
perspective, figure 2.2 shows the average distribution of the impacts associated with the input-
output table embedded in the CEER
7 Model.  The spatial concentration is again perceived as the 
extended core region of the country.  Its ability to internalize multiplier effects from the whole 
economy represents a further evidence of spatial concentration in Colombia.  Given the nature 
of the (backward) linkages associated with the Colombian economic structure, there appear 
elements for a “spatial trap” for the country, as all the regions are somehow dependent on the 
core. 
 
Figure 2.2. Linkages in Colombia  
(Average % share in net I-O output multipliers) 
                                                 




3. Spatial Aspects of Trade Liberalization 
 
The effects of trade reforms have been extensively studied in the international trade literature.  
However, as noticed by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), the literature on the relationship between 
trade and growth is already vast, and has failed to reach a consensus on the effect of trade on 
growth.  Trade liberalization processes are said to have benefits derived from gains in both the 
production side (there is an overall increase in the foreign exchange revenue earned in export 
industries, or saved in import industries, per unit of labor and capital) and the consumption side 
(the same basket of products can be obtained at lower cost).  However, the liberalization 
process also involves two kinds of short-run costs to the economy: distributional costs 
(protected sectors tend to lose) and balance of payments pressures due to the rapid increase in 
imports (Bruno, 1987).  However, the short-term growth consequences of a trade reform will 
depend on the structure of the reforming economy.  From a spatial perspective, the short-run 
effects will also be heavily influenced by the respective regional structures.  The first set of 
simulations in this paper will try to address some of these issues. 
 
The second set of simulations is inspired by the work by Krugman and Elisondo (1996).  They 
have shown that trade policies of developing countries and their tendency to develop huge 
metropolitan centers are closely linked.  They developed a spatial model in the New Economic 
Geography (NEG) tradition, whose equilibrating mechanisms draw heavily on the balance of 
real wage differentials through labor mobility.  Their Krugman-type core-periphery model, 
inspired by the case of Mexico, explained the existence of such giant cities as a consequence of 
the strong forward and backward linkages that arise when manufacturing tries to serve a small 
domestic market.  The model implies that these linkages are much weaker when the economy is 
open to international trade; in other words, closed markets promote huge central 
agglomerations, while open markets discourage them. Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 
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As seen in section 2, Colombia is characterized by strong spatial concentration.  Bogotá, the 
capital city, is responsible for around 25% of total GDP (28% in manufacturing), and covers 
only 0.14% of total territory.  Trade opening should then reduce its relative importance.  From 
the work by Krugman and Elisondo (1996), Krugman (1994), Puga (1998), and Alonso-Vilar 
(2001), the notion is advanced that trade liberalization policies may reduce regional inequality 
in developing countries, especially by reducing the size of primate cities or at least reducing 
their relative growth.  Trade liberalization would also lead to more specialized regions.  Given 
the long-run nature of these models, a final result would be strongly related to population 
movements from the core region, which would ultimately increase welfare through reduction of 
congestion costs.  However, empirical studies are not conclusive about these results. 
 
Ades and Glaeser (1995), using cross country data, did corroborate Krugman and Elisondo’s 
predictions, showing that countries with high shares of trade in GDP or low tariff barriers (even 
holding trade levels constant) rarely have their population concentrated in a single city.  The 
case of Mexico seems to reinforce the theoretical results.  Hanson (1998) showed that trade 
reform appears to have contributed to the breakup of the Mexico City manufacturing belt and 
the formation of new industrial centers in northern Mexico.  However, the reality of Brazil, 
another major Latin American country, seems to be more complex, as trade liberalization in the 
1990s did not produce any relevant de-concentration from the core region (Haddad, 1999; 
Haddad and Azzoni, 2002).  As Haddad and Hewings (2005) point out, one should consider 
some intermediate perspectives between a core-periphery model, on the one hand, and a 
perfectly competitive, homogeneous space model at the other extreme.  In the Brazilian case, 
firms can exploit increasing returns to scale without serving a national market; in large part, 
market imperfections derive from transportation costs that essentially serve to segment markets.  
Further, the asymmetries in the distribution of productive activity, with the primacy of São 
Paulo, serve to strengthen existing competitive advantages.  In a context of trade opening, 
peripheral regions may have then been adversely affected.  
 
A first attempt to test the Krugman and Elisondo model in Colombia was made by Fernández 
(1998).  This author concludes that, contrary to the predictions of the theory, the empirical 
evidence suggests a positive relationship between agglomeration and trade for most sectors, 
excluding food, beverages and chemicals, which showed a negative association.  As Fernández 
pointed out, further work should make a model more suitable for the Colombian case, and also 
consider that the effects of changes in trade liberalization on agglomeration may take longer to 
be seen.  In the second set of simulations in this paper, we look at the Colombian case, from a 
long-run perspective.  In addition, the model presents a finer spatial disaggregation, considering 
all 32 departments plus Bogotá, rather than just two cities, Bogotá and Barranquilla, as in 
Fernández’s approach.  A rather more realistic approach to spatial phenomena is considered, as 
opposed to the stylized models that have been used so far. 
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4. The CEER Model 
 
In this paper, we present the CEER Model, the first fully operational spatial CGE model for 
Colombia.
8  We use a similar approach to Haddad and Hewings (2005) to incorporate recent 
theoretical developments in the new economic geography.  Experimentation with the 
introduction of scale economies, market imperfections, and transportation costs provide 
innovative ways of dealing explicitly with theoretical issues related to integrated regional 
systems.  The model used in this research contains over 35,000 equations in its condensed form, 
and it is designed for policy analysis.  Agents’ behavior is modeled at the regional level, 
accommodating variations in the structure of regional economies. Regarding the regional 
setting, the main innovation in the CEER Model is the detailed treatment of interregional trade 
flows in the Colombian economy, in which the markets of regional flows are fully specified for 
each origin and destination.  The model recognizes the economies of the 32 Colombian 
Departments and the capital city, Bogotá.  
 
Results are based on a bottom-up approach – i.e. national results are obtained from the 
aggregation of regional results. The model identifies seven production/investment sectors in 
each region producing seven commodities (Table 4.1), one representative household in each 
region, regional governments, and one Central government, and a single foreign area that trades 
with each domestic region.  Two local primary factors are used in the production process, 
according to regional endowments (capital and labor).  The model is structurally calibrated for 
2004; a rather complete data set is available for that year, which is the year of the last 
publication of the full national input-output tables that served as the basis for the estimation of 
the interregional input-output database, facilitating the choice of the base year.  Additional 
structural data from the period 2000-2004 complemented the database. 
 
 






6 Public  administration 
7 Other  services 
 
The CEER framework includes explicitly some important elements from an interregional 
system, needed to better understand macro spatial phenomena, namely: interregional flows of 
goods and services, transportation costs based on origin-destination pairs, interregional 
movement of primary factors, regionalization of the transactions of the public sector, and 
regional labor markets segmentation.  
 
                                                 
8 A full model description is available in Appendix 2. Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 





The CGE core database requires detailed sectoral and regional information about the 
Colombian economy.  National data (such as input-output tables, foreign trade, taxes, margins 
and tariffs) are available from the Colombian Statistics Bureau (DANE).  At the regional level, 
a full set of accounts was developed by CEGA.  These two sets of information were put 
together in a balanced interregional social accounting matrix. Previous work in this task has 
been successfully implemented in CGE models for Brazil and Colombia (Haddad, 1999; Jensen 






Parameter values for international trade elasticities, σ s in equation (A2) in Appendix 2, were 
taken from estimates from Ocampo et al. (2004); regional trade elasticities, σ s in equation 
(A1), were set at the same values as the corresponding international trade elasticities (Table 
5.1).  Substitution elasticity between primary factors, σ s in equation (A3), was set to 0.5.  
Scale economies parameters, μ s in equation (A4), were set to one in all sectors and regions, 
except for the manufacturing sector in Bogotá, which was set to 0.8.  The marginal budget share 
in regional household consumption, β s in equation (A5), were calibrated from the SAM data, 
assuming the average budget share to be equal to the marginal budget share.  We have set to -
2.0 the export demand elasticities, η s in equation (A9).  Finally, we have assumed constant 
returns to bulk transportation, setting the parameter of scale economies in bulk transportation to 
one [θ s in equation (A12)]. 
 







Trade liberalization is an important element of the range of structural changes foreseen by the 
Colombian government. To explore the effects of such policies, the CEER Model is used to 
simulate the impacts of tariff changes in the Colombian economy.  The model is applied to 
analyze the effects of a uniform 25% decrease in all tariff rates.  All exogenous variables are set 
equal to zero, except the changes in the power of tariffs, i.e., one plus the tariff rates, which 
were set such that the percentage change decrease in each tariff rate was 25%.  Results of the 
simulation computed via a four-step Euler procedure with extrapolation, under short-run and 
long-run closures, are presented in tables 5.2-5.3 and 5.7-5.8; they show the percentage 
deviation from the base case (which is the situation without policy changes).
9  The analysis is 
                                                 
9 The model was implemented using the software GEMPACK. Trade Liberalization in Colombia 
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concentrated on the effects on spatial activity and welfare levels, and on some general macro 
variables.
10 Because of the nature of the data base, it should be pointed out that the model deals 
with changes in the real tariff rates (the ratio of import tax collected over the volume of 
imports), as opposed to nominal tariff rates, which are much higher. Moreover, the model does 
not consider non-tariff barriers.  Thus, the real tariff rate in 2004 (benchmark year) was close to 
5.5% as compared to the average nominal rate of over 10%. 
 
 
Table 5.1. Tariff Rate and Armington Elasticity, by Product 
 
Product  Tariff rate  Armington elasticity 
AGR 8.8  1.05 
MNE 0.9  1.28 
IND 5.7  1.63 
CNT 0.0  1.28 
TRN 2.7  1.34 
ADP 0.0  1.32 





Short-run   
 
Table 5.2 summarizes the simulation short-run results on some macro variables.  The real GDP 
of Colombia is shown to increase by 0.177 % with all regions positively affected (table 5.3), 
with real GRP increases ranging from 0.045% and 0.046% (Vaupés and Chocó, respectively) to 
0.275% and 0.292% (Cundinamarca and Bogotá).  
 
The results indicate that (industry) employment levels expand/contract in the same direction as 
activity levels.  However, the expansions of these changes are more intense for employment: 
the value of the percentage change in employment (0.264%) is higher than the value of 
percentage change in activity level (0.149%).  The explanation for the more intense change in 
the level of employment lies in the nature of the closure adopted in the simulation.  It reflects 
the combined effects of fixed capital stocks and the general change in the price of hiring labor, 
which captures movements in the nominal wage paid to workers (-0.336%) relative to 
movements in the producers’ product price (-0.380%).  Thus, given the nature of the closure, 
which allows for producers to respond to exogenous shocks through changes in the employment 
level only, the employment figure reveals the short-run supply responses from the model, for a 
tariff decrease (0.264%). 
 
                                                 
10 The volume of information that the model produces in each simulation is overwhelming. To interpret the results, 
we tried to focus the analysis on a few interesting issues associated with the respective simulations, in order to 
rationalize particular results in terms of the model’s theoretical framework and its underlying data base. This 
process, apart from giving insights into a particular economic phenomenon, serves to act as an informal 
verification of the simulations’ results. Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 
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Real household consumption increases by 0.483%, reflecting welfare gains as, with a fixed 
population, per capita real consumption also increases.  In the CEER Model, household 
consumption (in each region) is assumed to be a function of household disposable income.  
Since the national real wage is assumed fixed (nominal wages are indexed to the national CPI), 
this effect results directly from the increase in the activity level (employment effect).  An 




Table 5.2. Colombia: Short-Run Effects on Selected Macro Variables 
 
Real GDP  0.177 
Real Household Consumption  0.483 
Activity Level  0.149 
Employment: Persons  0.264 
Unemployment Rate (% point change)  -0.251 
Nominal Wage Paid by Producers  -0.336 
GDP Price Index  -0.380 
Consumer Price Index  -0.336 
Export Volume  0.380 
Import Volume  1.017 




To better understand the short-run regional results of the model, a thorough analysis of the 
structure of the economy is needed.  A close inspection on the benchmark data base is 
necessary, conducted not only on the relationships in the interregional input-output data base, 
but also on the other relevant structural parameters of the model.  Some of the main structural 
features of the economy in the base-year are revealed in the tables in Appendix 1.  As shown in 
Haddad et al. (2002), structural coefficients derived from the SAM lead short-run results in less 
flexible environments (closures).  As one precludes factor mobility to a great extent, 
understanding of disaggregated results may be achieved through econometric regressions on 
key structural coefficients.  
 
How important is the existing economic structure in explaining the short-run spatial results 
associated with a trade liberalization policy in Colombia?  Do backward and forward linkages 
matter?  To answer these questions, we regress the model results (GRP, activity level and 
equivalent variation) presented in table 5.3 against selected structural coefficients presented in 
Appendix 1.  The meta-regressions are shown in Tables 5.4 to 5.6. 
 
According to the results for GRP and regional activity level, tables 5.4 and 5.5, structural 
indicators explain 74 and 76 percent, respectively, of the variation across Departments in the 
CEER Model results.  These results go in the same direction (correlation of 92.08%), as can be 
visually perceived in figures 5.1 and 5.2.  Regional GRP/activity results show that, in general, 
Departments in the dynamic core of the country tend benefit most from the tariff cut, while Trade Liberalization in Colombia 
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peripheral regions are the main losers in the short-run.  Explanations for specific regional 
results should consider structural and parametric aspects of the data base.  Regions that present 
higher increases in their output tend to have an overall higher share of imports, benefiting from 
lower cost of imported inputs; however the higher the share of imports in final consumption 
(households), the lower the benefit to increase output in the region, as substitution effects at this 
stage of the chain do not translate into cost advantages (Table 5.5).  Also, regions that face 
stronger positive effects tend to concentrate their sales to other sectors (intermediate inputs), to 
households, or to foreign consumers.  A higher capital/labor ratio seems to hamper economic 
performance in the short-run, as employment expansion turns out to be less feasible.   
Specifically in terms of GRP effects, regions with a high share of the mining sector in their 
output are more likely to be harmed by the policy change.  In the case of the model results for 
welfare (figures 5.3 and 5.4), measured in terms of (relative) equivalent variation, the core 
region also benefits from the shock, both in absolute (EV) and relative terms (REV
11).  
 
The specification of the household demand system in the CEER Model allows the computation 
of measures of welfare. More specifically, one can calculate the equivalent variation (EV) 
associated with a policy change.  The equivalent variation is the amount of money one would 
need to give to an individual, if an economic change did not happen, to make him as well off as 
if it did (Layard and Walters, 1978).  The Hicksian measure of EV would consider computing 
the hypothetical change in income in prices of the post-shock equilibrium (Bröcker and 
Schneider, 2002).  Alternatively, it can be measured as the monetary change of benchmark 
income the representative household would need in order to get a post-simulation utility under 
benchmark prices.  Another informative welfare measure refers to the relative equivalent 
variation (REV).  It is defined as the percentage change of benchmark income the 
representative household would need in order to get a post-simulation utility under benchmark 
prices (Bröcker, 1998). 
 
Given the nature of the welfare measures, the relevant structural coefficients to explain regional 
performance identified in table 5.6 seem plausible.  In the short-run, regions with higher shares 
of imports in final consumption (households) would receive greater welfare gains.  The 
intuition here is that lower tariff rates would result in a greater volume of goods being available 
at lower prices in the regions.  Regions presenting high import shares of capital goods also tend 
to face welfare gains, through indirect effects in the consumption of (durable) consumer goods.  
On the other hand, regions that depend more on imported inputs and whose economic structures 
are more concentrated in the output of non-producer goods are negatively affected. 
                                                 
11 Relative equivalent variation is measured by the ratio of the equivalent variation to pre-shock regional household 
disposable income. Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 




Table 5.3.Colombia: Short-Run Effects on Selected Spatial Variables 
 
GRP Activity level Equivalent variation
D1 Antioquia 0.136 0.112 364,628
D2 Atlántico 0.147 0.135 112,651
D3 Bogotá D. C. 0.292 0.262 1,187,467
D4 Bolívar 0.113 0.093 86,795
D5 Boyacá 0.156 0.113 62,240
D6 Caldas 0.106 0.106 28,371
D7 Caquetá 0.052 0.053 3,184
D8 Cauca 0.064 0.053 19,940
D9 Cesar 0.115 0.110 30,169
D10 Córdoba 0.131 0.100 76,318
D11 Cundinamarca 0.275 0.258 214,639
D12 Chocó 0.046 0.042 3,805
D13 Huila 0.055 0.051 15,576
D14 La Guajira 0.110 0.100 33,038
D15 Magdalena 0.153 0.146 27,142
D16 Meta 0.121 0.115 26,222
D17 Nariño 0.119 0.090 33,091
D18 Norte Santander 0.105 0.097 24,256
D19 Quindío 0.087 0.086 8,416
D20 Risaralda 0.097 0.089 28,357
D21 Santander 0.198 0.132 286,486
D22 Sucre 0.084 0.083 7,527
D23 Tolima 0.101 0.090 33,516
D24 Valle 0.117 0.107 226,986
D25 Amazonas 0.064 0.065 533
D26 Arauca 0.274 0.139 11,584
D27 Casanare 0.060 0.061 28,015
D28 Guanía 0.054 0.053 301
D29 Guaviare 0.116 0.124 1,218
D30 Putumayo 0.092 0.092 2,811
D31 San Andrés y Providencia 0.181 0.174 4,878
D32 Vaupés 0.045 0.047 159
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Table 5.4. Structural Analysis of Short-run GRP Results 
 
Dependent Variable: PIB_SR 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 02/08/08   Time: 11:19 
Sample: 1 33 
Included observations: 33 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  -0.239680  0.102458 -2.339312  0.0270 
IMPSHTOT   0.361736  0.105921  3.415145  0.0020 
SH_1   0.434683  0.128793  3.375053  0.0022 
SH_3   0.459034  0.153107  2.998128  0.0058 
SH_4   0.642070  0.124899  5.140696  0.0000 
MNE  -0.314800  0.059138 -5.323118  0.0000 
R-squared   0.744891     Mean dependent var   0.122212 
Adjusted R-squared   0.697649     S.D. dependent var   0.064111 
S.E. of regression   0.035252     Akaike info criterion  -3.689598 
Sum squared resid   0.033554     Schwarz criterion  -3.417506 
Log likelihood   66.87836     F-statistic   15.76742 
Durbin-Watson stat   2.610830     Prob(F-statistic)   0.000000 
 
PIB_SR = percentage change in GRP; IMPSHTOT = import penetration in total consumption; SH_1 = 
intermediate inputs share in total sales; SH_3 = household share in total sales; SH_4 = export share in total sales; 
MNE = share of mining in total output 
 
Table 5.5. Structural Analysis of Short-run Activity Level Results 
 
Dependent Variable: ACT_SR 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 02/08/08   Time: 11:24 
Sample: 1 33 
Included observations: 33 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  -0.157437  0.083251 -1.891106  0.0698 
IMPSH_3  -0.666530  0.342087 -1.948421  0.0622 
IMPSHTOT   1.310548  0.430980  3.040852  0.0053 
SH_1   0.390297  0.106954  3.649206  0.0012 
SH_3   0.370619  0.124310  2.981411  0.0062 
SH_4   0.407252  0.095772  4.252299  0.0002 
KL  -0.064311  0.020033 -3.210213  0.0035 
R-squared   0.758846     Mean dependent var   0.107636 
Adjusted R-squared   0.703195     S.D. dependent var   0.051930 
S.E. of regression   0.028291     Akaike info criterion  -4.106683 
Sum squared resid   0.020811     Schwarz criterion  -3.789242 
Log likelihood   74.76028     F-statistic   13.63581 
Durbin-Watson stat   2.399898     Prob(F-statistic)   0.000001 
 
ACT_SR = percentage change in regional activity level; IMPSH_3 = import penetration in household 
consumption; IMPSHTOT = import penetration in total consumption; SH_1 = intermediate inputs share in total 
sales; SH_3 = household share in total sales; SH_4 = export share in total sales; KL = capital to labor ratio. 
 Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 
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Table 5.6. Structural Analysis of Short-run Equivalent Variation Results 
 
Dependent Variable: EV_SR 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 02/08/08   Time: 12:11 
Sample: 1 33 
Included observations: 33 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C   101092.5  29728.72  3.400500  0.0020 
IMPSH_1  -14102528  2096919. -6.725356  0.0000 
IMPSH_2   6023651.  916107.7  6.575266  0.0000 
IMPSH_3   12497712  2030318.  6.155545  0.0000 
NONCON  -311691.1  125681.9 -2.479999  0.0194 
R-squared   0.828179     Mean dependent var   90662.75 
Adjusted R-squared   0.803633     S.D. dependent var   215852.8 
S.E. of regression   95651.41     Akaike info criterion   25.91354 
Sum squared resid   2.56E+11     Schwarz criterion   26.14028 
Log likelihood  -422.5733     F-statistic   33.74013 
Durbin-Watson stat   2.206785     Prob(F-statistic)   0.000000 
 
EV_SR = change in regional equivalent variation; IMPSH_1 = import penetration in intermediate consumption; 
IMPSH_2 = import penetration in capital goods consumption; IMPSH_3 = import penetration in household 
consumption; NONCON = share of non-consumer goods in total output. 
 
Figure 5.1. Short-run Effects on GRP  Figure 5.2. Short-run Effects on 
Activity Level 
  Trade Liberalization in Colombia 
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Figure 5.3. Short-run Effects on 
Equivalent Variation 
Figure 5.4. Short-run Effects on 
Relative Equivalent Variation 
 
Long-run   
 
The results described above refer to the short-run effects of the tariff reduction, which are 
important for macroeconomic management.  As trade reform aims at improving the allocation 
of resources in the long term, a simulation was carried out adopting a long-run closure, in the 
realm of new economic geography models.  In this exercise, the assumptions on interregional 
mobility of capital and labor are relaxed and a steady-state-type of solution is achieved, in 
which regional natural unemployment rates and regional aggregate rates of return are 
reestablished.  Moreover, balance of payment equilibrium is reflected in the hypothesis of fixed 
share of trade balance in GDP.  From a spatial perspective, in the long-run the “re-location” 
effect becomes relevant; as factors are free to move between regions, new investment decisions 
define marginal re-location of activities, in the sense that the spatial distribution of capital 
stocks and the population changes.  In what follows, attention will be focused on results usually 
discussed in the NEG literature, presented in section 3.  
 
Table 5.7 shows the long-run results of the simulation for selected national variables.  As the 
aggregate level of employment is now assumed exogenously determined by demographic 
variables, the national real wage is allowed to change to keep national employment in the base 
case level.  Supply-side effects are restricted to the distribution of labor across sectors and 
regions, and to capital movements.  At the national level, the increase in GDP by 0.027% above 
the base case level is possible through the increase in the capital stock of the economy (0.149%) 
induced by the initial fall in the aggregate rental price of capital.  Imported commodities are 
important inputs for capital creation and the fall in the prices of imports reduces the cost of 
producing capital.  The hypothesis of fixed trade balance share in GDP together with low export Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 
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elasticities are accompanied by reductions in the real wage to make exports more competitive.  
With lower real wages, household disposable income goes down in real terms, inducing a 
decrease in the real household consumption.  As regional government consumption of public 
goods is assumed to move with regional household consumption, and central government 
consumption of public goods follows the national household consumption level, domestic 
absorption is leveraged only by real investments.  As a consequence, real GDP growth is 
smaller than in the short-run.  
 
 
Table 5.7. Colombia: Long-Run Effects on Selected Macro Variables (% change) 
 
Real GDP  0.027 
Real Household Consumption  -0.269 
Real Investment  0.937 
Capital Stock  0.149 
Activity Level  0.043 
Regional Government Consumption  -0.168 
Central Government Consumption  -0.269 
Consumer Price Index  0.326 
International Export Volume  0.704 
International Import Volume  0.349 
Balance of Trade (percentage of GDP)  - 
Nominal Wage  -0.416 
GDP Price Index  0.319 
 
 
From a sectoral perspective, long-run results clearly benefit the tradable-good sectors as well as 
investment-related activities.  Estimates presented in table 5.8 show that there is a shift in the 
Colombian economic structure towards agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and construction, at 
the expense of service sectors. 
 
 












Regional unemployment and wage differentials are assumed constant in the simulation.  The 
CEER Model accommodates the labor market assumptions by allowing population movements Trade Liberalization in Colombia 
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between regions so that labor supply is increased in regions experiencing employment 
expansion, and vice-versa.  The impact of the trade liberalization policy favors activity levels 
outside Bogotá, especially in its vicinity, at the expense of the main economic center, with a 
consequent transfer of population from the latter (Figure 5.5).  
 
Figure 5.5. Long-run Effects on 
Population Growth 
 
In the long-run, producers are able to reevaluate their investment decisions, which was not 
possible in the short-run.  The short-run movements in the rental values of capital and cost of 
capital define differential rates of returns in each sector, providing indicators of more profitable 
investment opportunities.  Current rates of return are defined by the ratio of the rental values of 
a unit of capital (that depends on the productivity of the current capital stock in each industry) 
and the cost of a unit of capital, based on its cost structure.  The CEER Model assumes that if 
the percentage change in the rate of return in a regional industry grows faster than the national 
average rate of return, capital stocks in that industry will increase at a higher rate than the 
average national stock.  For industries with lower-than-average increase in their rates of return 
to fixed capital, capital stocks increase at a lower-than-average rate, i.e., capital is attracted to 
higher return industries.  
 
The role of price changes proves to be very important in understanding the net results, in real 
terms in the components of GRP, in the different Departments.  Regions that do not face strong 
price changes benefit more from real growth, as they perceive gains in relative efficiency.   
From a spatial perspective, there appears to be a de-concentration pattern from Bogotá to its 
vicinity.  It is noteworthy that movements within the extended core region of the Colombian 
economy tend to go towards the coast.  This “coastal effect” relates also to the cost structure of 
the regional economies. Given their location closer to external markets, the relative importance 
of tariffs to these regions is greater, as they face lower internal transportation costs to the ports Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 
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of entry/exit.  Thus, market accessibility is one of the elements that implicitly drives the spatial 
activity results in the long-run. 
 
As for welfare, the measures used in the model reflect also congestion effects in the long run, as 
they impose a penalty to population growth.
12  Regions that present better indicators for 
welfare, in relative terms (REV), are those regions that face reductions in congestion costs, 
measured in terms of population change.
13  The spatial pattern that arises reveals welfare 
improvement only in Bogotá and a few peripheral Departments, further away from the 
Colombian economic core. 
 
Finally, we analyzed the impact on regional specialization.  As has been noted, one of the main 
results of the NEG literature on the effects of trade liberalization is that regions become more 
specialized.  To look at this issue, we calculated the regional coefficients of specialization 
(Isard, 1960), using the benchmark database and the post-simulation updated database.  We 
identified then the Departments that presented increases in their coefficients of specialization 
after the trade liberalization experiment (in figure 5.10 those regions in dark color).  Together, 
these Departments are responsible for close to 75% of total output in Colombia.  Given the 
nature of the coefficient – which compares two percentage  distributions measuring the extent 
to which the distribution of output by sector in a given region deviate from such distribution for 
Colombia – the fact that the bigger regions become more specialized suggests that Colombian 
regions, in general, become more specialized.  This result supports theoretical findings in the 
NEG literature.   
                                                 
12 In the equation for equivalent variation the relevant argument is the variable utility per household. As the 
number of households in each region follows population change, immigrants will negatively impact on welfare, 
increasing congestion costs in the region. 
13 A correlation of -97.7% between the results for population change and relative equivalent variation is estimated 
for the long-run. Trade Liberalization in Colombia 
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Table 5.9. Long-run Effects on GRP Components (% change) 
 
 
Exports Imports Exports Imports
D1 Antioquia 0.652 4.422 0.652 -0.269 -0.184 1.124 1.027 2.012 0.927 0.485 0.280
D2 Atlántico -0.049 1.178 -0.049 -0.269 0.256 -0.014 1.100 1.260 0.187 0.213 0.258
D3 Bogotá D. C. -0.507 -0.081 -0.507 -0.269 -0.275 -0.298 0.528 0.050 -0.551 0.604 0.458
D4 Bolívar 0.228 4.049 0.228 -0.269 0.539 0.411 1.284 1.711 0.637 -0.137 0.138
D5 Boyacá -1.489 -4.140 -1.489 -0.269 0.163 -1.402 0.682 -0.316 -0.611 -0.209 0.458
D6 Caldas -0.181 -0.285 -0.181 -0.269 0.274 -0.163 1.386 0.590 0.100 -0.064 0.103
D7 Caquetá -1.057 -6.147 -1.057 -0.269 -0.086 -1.643 0.939 -0.825 -0.768 -0.077 0.261
D8 Cauca -0.897 -3.829 -0.897 -0.269 0.355 -1.097 1.142 -0.218 -0.682 0.002 0.205
D9 Cesar -0.064 3.006 -0.064 -0.269 -0.152 0.296 0.566 1.523 0.267 0.428 0.297
D10 Córdoba 0.171 2.658 0.171 -0.269 0.557 0.678 1.522 0.584 0.750 -0.204 -0.034
D11 Cundinamarca -1.233 -0.314 -1.233 -0.269 -1.205 -0.254 0.036 -0.081 -0.936 1.383 0.929
D12 Chocó -2.028 -6.091 -2.028 -0.269 -0.078 -2.912 -1.312 -0.848 -1.965 0.775 0.669
D13 Huila 0.051 1.520 0.051 -0.269 0.099 0.298 0.967 0.374 0.444 -0.210 0.035
D14 La Guajira 0.061 3.797 0.061 -0.270 -0.013 0.554 0.314 0.832 0.247 0.601 0.263
D15 Magdalena -0.240 -1.488 -0.240 -0.269 0.097 -0.572 1.819 0.734 0.019 -0.173 0.156
D16 Meta -0.113 1.293 -0.113 -0.269 -0.012 -0.009 0.846 -0.014 0.321 -0.203 0.053
D17 Nariño -0.262 -0.344 -0.262 -0.269 0.227 -0.339 1.064 0.871 0.046 -0.039 0.177
D18 Norte Santander -0.451 -2.122 -0.451 -0.269 0.407 -0.675 0.815 0.430 -0.122 -0.149 0.179
D19 Quindío -0.419 -1.840 -0.419 -0.269 0.334 -0.575 1.294 -0.054 -0.150 -0.165 0.114
D20 Risaralda 0.064 1.188 0.064 -0.269 0.304 0.258 1.232 1.402 0.320 0.156 0.170
D21 Santander -1.160 -1.635 -1.160 -0.269 0.393 -0.742 0.847 -0.157 -0.440 -0.181 0.186
D22 Sucre -0.032 0.132 -0.032 -0.269 0.613 0.058 1.211 0.125 0.259 -0.138 0.148
D23 Tolima -0.498 -0.984 -0.498 -0.269 0.268 -0.501 0.637 0.724 -0.064 -0.148 0.217
D24 Valle 0.061 1.852 0.061 -0.269 0.373 0.167 1.305 0.873 0.364 -0.019 0.164
D25 Amazonas 0.787 -5.605 0.787 -0.269 0.119 -0.422 4.969 0.229 1.316 -3.387 -0.612
D26 Arauca 1.626 9.318 1.626 -0.269 -0.229 2.181 1.628 3.277 1.440 -0.141 0.088
D27 Casanare 0.030 1.939 0.030 -0.269 -0.048 0.494 0.286 1.645 0.261 0.700 0.509
D28 Guanía 1.492 7.306 1.492 -0.269 0.206 1.794 5.841 0.090 2.225 -1.988 -0.489
D29 Guaviare -3.107 -13.803 -3.107 -0.269 -0.564 -3.876 -2.556 -2.035 -2.759 1.270 0.841
D30 Putumayo -0.417 -0.199 -0.417 -0.269 0.209 -0.405 0.609 -0.346 0.053 -0.118 0.186
D31 San Andrés y Providencia 0.193 3.186 0.193 -0.269 0.698 0.493 1.677 0.129 0.538 -0.152 0.159
D32 Vaupés -0.798 -3.835 -0.798 -0.269 0.036 -0.720 0.149 -0.417 -0.640 0.519 0.144
D33 Vichada -1.500 -8.927 -1.500 -0.269 -0.322 -1.804 -0.305 -1.401 -1.201 0.183 0.289
National -0.269 0.937 -0.168 -0.269 0.000 0.000 0.704 0.490 0.270 0.319 0.360
CPI Regional International GRP GRP Deflator Household Investment Regional Govt Central Govt
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Figure 5.6. Long-run Effects on GRP  Figure 5.7. Long-run Effects on Activity 
Level 
  
Figure 5.8. Long-run Effects on 
Equivalent Variation 
Figure 5.9. Long-run Effects on 
Relative Equivalent Variation 
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Figure 5.10. Long-run Effects on Regional 
Specialization (1 = more specialized) 
 
Systematic Sensitivity Analysis 
 
How sensitive are the results to parameter specification?  In this sub-section, sensitivity 
analysis for key parameters is performed, providing a more reliable range of model results.  
Given the nature of the simulations, key parameters are represented by the export demand 
elasticities and the regional/international trade elasticities (Armington elasticities). 
Experience with spatial CGE modeling has suggested that interregional substitution is the 
key mechanism that drives the model’s spatial results.  In general, interregional linkages 
play an important role in the functioning of interregional CGE models.  These linkages are 
driven by trade relations (commodity flows), and factor mobility (capital and labor 
migration).  In the first case, of direct interest to our exercise, interregional trade flows 
should be incorporated in the model.  Interregional input-output databases are required to 
calibrate the model, and regional trade elasticities play a crucial role in the adjustment 
process.  Moreover, from a spatial perspective, the role of scale parameters in the 
manufacturing sectors should also be assessed.  
 
The scenarios related to the tariff cut experiments discussed above were employed using 
the Gaussian quadrature
14 approach to establish confidence intervals for the main results.  
The range for the parameters in the first group of sensitivity analyses was set to +/- 25% 
                                                 
14 The Gaussian Quadrature (GQ) approach (Arndt, 1996; DeVuyst and Preckel, 1997), used in this exercise, 
was proposed to evaluate CGE model results’ sensitivity to parameters and exogenous shocks. This approach 
views key exogenous variables (shocks or parameters) as random variables with associated distributions. Due 
to the randomness in the exogenous variables, the endogenous results are also random; the GQ approach 
produces estimates of the mean and standard deviations of the endogenous model results, thus providing an 
approximation of the true distribution associated with the results. Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 
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around the default values, with independent, symmetric, triangular distributions for three 
sets of parameters, namely the export demand elasticities for the various products, η s in 
equation (A9) in the Appendix 2, and Armington elasticities of substitution between goods 
from different domestic regions, σ s in equation (A1), and between imported and domestic 
goods, σ s in equation (A2).  
 
The second group of sensitivity analyses was carried out in the scale economies parameters 
in the regional manufacturing sectors, μ s in equation (A4), using a similar range around 
the default values (+/- 25%). 
 
Tables 5.10 summarizes the sensitivity of GRP results in each Colombian territorial unit, as 
well as for the country as a whole, for the ranges in the two sets of parameters, both in the 
short-run and long-run scenarios.  The lower bound and the upper bound columns represent 
the 90% confidence intervals for the estimates, constructed using Chebyshev’s inequality.  
We observe that, in general, aggregate GRP results are relatively more robust to scale 
economy parameters than to trade elasticities both in the short-run and in the long-run.  
Overall, the territorial results can be considered to be more robust to both sets of parameters 
in the short run closure.
15 
 
                                                 
15 In the long run there appear (a few) cases with qualititative changes (changes in sign) within the confidence 
interval, especially for smaller regions. Trade Liberalization in Colombia 
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Table 5.10. Systematic Sensitivity Analysis: GRP/GDP changes (%) 
 
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
D1 Antioquia 0.13106 0.14167 0.84223 1.01114 0.13437 0.13836 0.90154 0.95183
D2 Atlántico 0.14105 0.15212 0.17045 0.20303 0.14647 0.14670 0.17966 0.19381
D3 Bogotá D. C. 0.27741 0.30735 -0.57592 -0.52666 0.29072 0.29404 -0.57735 -0.52523
D4 Bolívar 0.10766 0.11905 0.56298 0.71104 0.11315 0.11355 0.62688 0.64713
D5 Boyacá 0.14578 0.16566 -0.69320 -0.52807 0.15310 0.15834 -0.67065 -0.55061
D6 Caldas 0.09895 0.11313 0.07267 0.12802 0.10589 0.10619 0.08606 0.11463
D7 Caquetá 0.03958 0.06512 -0.86085 -0.67442 0.05115 0.05354 -0.78556 -0.74971
D8 Cauca 0.05733 0.07111 -1.61065 0.24679 0.06420 0.06424 -0.87050 -0.49336
D9 Cesar 0.11146 0.11908 0.22671 0.30767 0.11359 0.11694 0.24758 0.28680
D10 Córdoba 0.12454 0.13707 0.68171 0.81830 0.12883 0.13279 0.71318 0.78683
D11 Cundinamarca 0.25878 0.29208 -1.18673 -0.68512 0.25609 0.29476 -1.10418 -0.76767
D12 Chocó 0.04031 0.05150 -6.00005 2.06926 0.04501 0.04680 -2.61918 -1.31161
D13 Huila 0.04998 0.05944 0.17573 0.71194 0.05346 0.05596 0.38752 0.50015
D14 La Guajira 0.10622 0.11351 0.19313 0.30085 0.10878 0.11095 0.22695 0.26703
D15 Magdalena 0.14572 0.16117 -0.00466 0.04203 0.15193 0.15496 0.00193 0.03544
D16 Meta 0.11400 0.12711 0.28130 0.36048 0.11892 0.12219 0.31226 0.32952
D17 Nariño 0.11181 0.12708 -0.05509 0.14726 0.11424 0.12464 0.00651 0.08566
D18 Norte Santander 0.09992 0.10949 -0.15220 -0.09168 0.10378 0.10563 -0.13748 -0.10640
D19 Quindío 0.08089 0.09335 -0.19703 -0.10284 0.08606 0.08818 -0.18234 -0.11753
D20 Risaralda 0.09273 0.10176 -0.13238 0.77173 0.09707 0.09743 0.20565 0.43371
D21 Santander 0.18896 0.20755 -0.54192 -0.33773 0.19712 0.19939 -0.51375 -0.36591
D22 Sucre 0.07751 0.09137 0.20091 0.31687 0.08304 0.08584 0.19209 0.32568
D23 Tolima 0.09252 0.10932 -0.67090 0.54223 0.09921 0.10264 -0.07549 -0.05318
D24 Valle 0.11063 0.12433 0.31131 0.41675 0.11678 0.11818 0.33682 0.39124
D25 Amazonas 0.05964 0.06933 1.00127 1.63128 0.06380 0.06517 1.26571 1.36684
D26 Arauca 0.21969 0.32812 1.26506 1.61526 0.26288 0.28493 1.39586 1.48445
D27 Casanare 0.05409 0.06590 0.23381 0.28761 0.05865 0.06134 0.25952 0.26189
D28 Guanía 0.04981 0.05777 -11.80199 16.25231 0.05312 0.05446 1.83696 2.61336
D29 Guaviare 0.10619 0.12582 -3.12476 -2.39250 0.11438 0.11764 -2.76846 -2.74880
D30 Putumayo 0.08807 0.09549 -0.02026 0.12526 0.09045 0.09311 0.04432 0.06068
D31 San Andrés y Providencia 0.17729 0.18469 0.46830 0.60757 0.17999 0.18199 0.52974 0.54613
D32 Vaupés 0.03808 0.05204 -0.77122 -0.50942 0.04377 0.04634 -0.71516 -0.56548
D33 Vichada 0.15074 0.18322 -1.31811 -1.08386 0.16499 0.16897 -1.20236 -1.19960
National 0.17054 0.18302 0.01558 0.03743 0.17411 0.17944 0.01925 0.03376
Trade elasticities Scale economies parameters
Short run Long run Short run Long run
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6. Final Remarks 
 
This paper has offered some preliminary steps in the marriage of some of the theoretical 
foundations of the new economic geography with spatial computable general equilibrium 
models.  Modeling the spatial economy of Colombia using the traditional assumptions of 
CGE models makes little sense when one territorial unit, Bogotá, accounts for over one 
fourth of GDP and where transportation costs are high and accessibility low, compared to 
European or North American standards.  Hence, handling market imperfections becomes 
imperative as does the need to address internal spatial issues from the perspective of 
Colombia’s increasing involvement with external markets.  The paper built on the CEER 
Model, a spatial CGE model of the Colombian economy with non-constant returns and 
non-iceberg transportation costs.  
 
The results of tariff cut simulations confirmed the asymmetric impacts that trade 
liberalization has on a spatial economy in which one region, Bogotá, is able to more fully 
exploit scale economies vis-à-vis the rest of Colombia.  The analysis also revealed the 
importance of different hypotheses on factor mobility and the role of price effects to better 
understand the consequences of trade opening in a developing economy.  We found 
considerable differences from short-run and long-run impacts.  While in the short-run 
structural constraints impose a spatial trap that leads to more concentration, in the long-run 
factor mobility enables spatial re-location of production in a way that regional disparities 
tend to diminish. In summary, long-run results using the spatial CGE approach has shown 
to be able to reconcile theoretical predictions based on recent economic geography models 
with empirical applications to real economies.  However, this model (as with all CGE 
models) does not account for inertia factors that may preclude the spatial reallocations that 
the price signals indicate.  As noted earlier, in Brazil, significant trade liberalization over a 
decade has not been accompanied by any significant spatial re-allocation of economic 
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Appendix 1. Structural Indicators 
 
 
Table A.1. Import Penetration, by User 
 
Intermediate Capital goods Consumer goods Total
D1 Antioquia 0.074 0.037 0.070 0.050
D2 Atlántico 0.085 0.059 0.078 0.071
D3 Bogotá D. C. 0.317 0.273 0.308 0.283
D4 Bolívar 0.086 0.059 0.074 0.062
D5 Boyacá 0.015 0.004 0.015 0.010
D6 Caldas 0.029 0.014 0.026 0.023
D7 Caquetá 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.007
D8 Cauca 0.033 0.017 0.031 0.025
D9 Cesar 0.077 0.056 0.070 0.049
D10 Córdoba 0.017 0.004 0.016 0.010
D11 Cundinamarca 0.379 0.263 0.310 0.236
D12 Chocó 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.006
D13 Huila 0.014 0.002 0.014 0.009
D14 La Guajira 0.294 0.103 0.297 0.171
D15 Magdalena 0.071 0.050 0.065 0.054
D16 Meta 0.013 0.001 0.013 0.009
D17 Nariño 0.095 0.055 0.088 0.069
D18 Norte Santander 0.036 0.017 0.033 0.024
D19 Quindío 0.019 0.003 0.015 0.013
D20 Risaralda 0.065 0.044 0.059 0.052
D21 Santander 0.050 0.009 0.051 0.033
D22 Sucre 0.014 0.001 0.012 0.009
D23 Tolima 0.031 0.016 0.029 0.023
D24 Valle 0.089 0.032 0.085 0.075
D25 Amazonas 0.020 0.004 0.015 0.012
D26 Arauca 0.026 0.014 0.025 0.015
D27 Casanare 0.019 0.010 0.021 0.008
D28 Guanía 0.013 0.000 0.011 0.008
D29 Guaviare 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.008
D30 Putumayo 0.013 0.000 0.011 0.009
D31 San Andrés y Providencia 0.021 0.000 0.011 0.014
D32 Vaupés 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.007
D33 Vichada 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.011
National 0.145 0.097 0.157 0.116  
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D31 San Andrés y Providencia 0.036
D32 Vaupés 0.027
D33 Vichada 0.036
National 0.055  
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Table A.3. Sales Shares, by User 
 
Intermediate Investors Households Foreign Government
D1 Antioquia 0.332 0.110 0.307 0.174 0.077
D2 Atlántico 0.456 0.081 0.337 0.033 0.093
D3 Bogotá D. C. 0.330 0.086 0.465 0.039 0.079
D4 Bolívar 0.421 0.077 0.307 0.055 0.140
D5 Boyacá 0.356 0.077 0.385 0.021 0.162
D6 Caldas 0.453 0.072 0.337 0.034 0.103
D7 Caquetá 0.333 0.076 0.353 0.002 0.237
D8 Cauca 0.400 0.096 0.354 0.020 0.129
D9 Cesar 0.293 0.054 0.242 0.342 0.068
D10 Córdoba 0.437 0.105 0.298 0.054 0.106
D11 Cundinamarca 0.272 0.055 0.241 0.339 0.093
D12 Chocó 0.271 0.165 0.332 0.009 0.223
D13 Huila 0.290 0.110 0.308 0.146 0.146
D14 La Guajira 0.259 0.045 0.178 0.460 0.058
D15 Magdalena 0.351 0.058 0.374 0.053 0.164
D16 Meta 0.408 0.081 0.275 0.143 0.094
D17 Nariño 0.322 0.139 0.325 0.083 0.131
D18 Norte Santander 0.316 0.060 0.353 0.035 0.236
D19 Quindío 0.356 0.085 0.399 0.029 0.131
D20 Risaralda 0.382 0.144 0.335 0.033 0.106
D21 Santander 0.410 0.129 0.292 0.056 0.113
D22 Sucre 0.359 0.088 0.394 0.011 0.147
D23 Tolima 0.376 0.104 0.352 0.043 0.125
D24 Valle 0.460 0.084 0.323 0.023 0.109
D25 Amazonas 0.145 0.009 0.542 0.006 0.298
D26 Arauca 0.135 0.028 0.131 0.640 0.066
D27 Casanare 0.264 0.076 0.093 0.545 0.023
D28 Guanía 0.127 0.093 0.560 0.003 0.217
D29 Guaviare 0.158 0.069 0.530 0.002 0.240
D30 Putumayo 0.126 0.034 0.632 0.083 0.125
D31 San Andrés y Providencia 0.549 0.015 0.286 0.018 0.132
D32 Vaupés 0.230 0.042 0.440 0.026 0.262
D33 Vichada 0.253 0.056 0.540 0.001 0.149
National 0.096 0.015 0.554 0.176 0.159  
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Table A.4. Interregional Trade Indicators, by Department 
 
Import penetration Export share
D1 Antioquia 0.265 0.170
D2 Atlántico 0.298 0.382
D3 Bogotá D. C. 0.140 0.260
D4 Bolívar 0.346 0.372
D5 Boyacá 0.408 0.323
D6 Caldas 0.273 0.326
D7 Caquetá 0.392 0.333
D8 Cauca 0.254 0.204
D9 Cesar 0.353 0.290
D10 Córdoba 0.307 0.338
D11 Cundinamarca 0.143 0.227
D12 Chocó 0.373 0.195
D13 Huila 0.377 0.265
D14 La Guajira 0.203 0.256
D15 Magdalena 0.312 0.298
D16 Meta 0.314 0.350
D17 Nariño 0.338 0.299
D18 Norte Santander 0.312 0.225
D19 Quindío 0.352 0.269
D20 Risaralda 0.289 0.258
D21 Santander 0.308 0.272
D22 Sucre 0.379 0.321
D23 Tolima 0.384 0.352
D24 Valle 0.293 0.393
D25 Amazonas 0.405 0.065
D26 Arauca 0.411 0.138
D27 Casanare 0.326 0.254
D28 Guanía 0.458 0.061
D29 Guaviare 0.548 0.191
D30 Putumayo 0.602 0.144
D31 San Andrés y Providencia 0.280 0.509
D32 Vaupés 0.466 0.247
D33 Vichada 0.559 0.352  
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Table A.5. Cost Shares 
 
Labor Capital K/L Intermediate VA OTC
D1 Antioquia 0.512 0.488 0.953 0.506 0.553 -0.058
D2 Atlántico 0.504 0.496 0.984 0.483 0.515 0.002
D3 Bogotá D. C. 0.499 0.501 1.006 0.457 0.510 0.033
D4 Bolívar 0.504 0.496 0.983 0.547 0.517 -0.064
D5 Boyacá 0.558 0.442 0.794 0.529 0.666 -0.195
D6 Caldas 0.573 0.427 0.745 0.452 0.545 0.003
D7 Caquetá 0.666 0.334 0.501 0.356 0.646 -0.002
D8 Cauca 0.542 0.458 0.845 0.498 0.538 -0.036
D9 Cesar 0.473 0.527 1.115 0.304 0.525 0.170
D10 Córdoba 0.490 0.510 1.042 0.441 0.761 -0.202
D11 Cundinamarca 0.570 0.430 0.756 0.412 0.452 0.136
D12 Chocó 0.551 0.449 0.816 0.411 0.689 -0.101
D13 Huila 0.544 0.456 0.839 0.357 0.604 0.038
D14 La Guajira 0.371 0.629 1.697 0.250 0.519 0.231
D15 Magdalena 0.633 0.367 0.580 0.371 0.591 0.038
D16 Meta 0.563 0.437 0.777 0.387 0.607 0.006
D17 Nariño 0.611 0.389 0.636 0.375 0.585 0.040
D18 Norte Santander 0.588 0.412 0.702 0.409 0.613 -0.021
D19 Quindío 0.600 0.400 0.666 0.416 0.582 0.002
D20 Risaralda 0.535 0.465 0.870 0.463 0.530 0.007
D21 Santander 0.522 0.478 0.917 0.601 0.619 -0.220
D22 Sucre 0.618 0.382 0.618 0.373 0.629 -0.002
D23 Tolima 0.574 0.426 0.741 0.436 0.611 -0.047
D24 Valle 0.519 0.481 0.927 0.481 0.519 0.000
D25 Amazonas 0.641 0.359 0.561 0.347 0.648 0.005
D26 Arauca 0.487 0.513 1.052 0.134 0.285 0.581
D27 Casanare 0.288 0.712 2.471 0.262 0.594 0.145
D28 Guanía 0.593 0.407 0.686 0.388 0.651 -0.039
D29 Guaviare 0.689 0.311 0.451 0.344 0.654 0.002
D30 Putumayo 0.557 0.443 0.796 0.328 0.624 0.048
D31 San Andrés y Providencia 0.572 0.428 0.750 0.385 0.616 0.000
D32 Vaupés 0.699 0.301 0.431 0.334 0.671 -0.005
D33 Vichada 0.722 0.278 0.385 0.325 0.678 -0.003
National 0.518 0.482 0.930 0.454 0.541 0.005  
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Table A.6. Sectoral Shares, by Department 
 
AGR MNE IND CNT TRN ADP OTS
D1 Antioquia 0.118 0.035 0.197 0.069 0.045 0.072 0.464
D2 Atlántico 0.033 0.005 0.207 0.039 0.061 0.085 0.571
D3 Bogotá D. C. 0.002 0.006 0.173 0.060 0.058 0.084 0.617
D4 Bolívar 0.102 0.023 0.299 0.035 0.050 0.133 0.357
D5 Boyacá 0.182 0.046 0.141 0.048 0.057 0.130 0.396
D6 Caldas 0.195 0.012 0.150 0.036 0.084 0.088 0.434
D7 Caquetá 0.388 0.002 0.028 0.046 0.021 0.185 0.330
D8 Cauca 0.186 0.010 0.221 0.054 0.027 0.120 0.382
D9 Cesar 0.214 0.339 0.054 0.037 0.047 0.064 0.245
D10 Córdoba 0.201 0.297 0.035 0.053 0.058 0.070 0.286
D11 Cundinamarca 0.270 0.014 0.226 0.034 0.041 0.102 0.314
D12 Chocó 0.170 0.143 0.006 0.115 0.058 0.180 0.328
D13 Huila 0.233 0.168 0.033 0.076 0.034 0.122 0.333
D14 La Guajira 0.063 0.513 0.007 0.034 0.025 0.055 0.304
D15 Magdalena 0.270 0.004 0.039 0.038 0.078 0.138 0.433
D16 Meta 0.296 0.158 0.066 0.045 0.060 0.071 0.305
D17 Nariño 0.284 0.011 0.037 0.098 0.041 0.112 0.417
D18 Norte Santander 0.146 0.024 0.061 0.041 0.066 0.197 0.464
D19 Quindío 0.172 0.005 0.058 0.059 0.117 0.115 0.475
D20 Risaralda 0.092 0.008 0.146 0.095 0.077 0.099 0.481
D21 Santander 0.136 0.024 0.225 0.076 0.063 0.090 0.387
D22 Sucre 0.279 0.009 0.028 0.056 0.034 0.118 0.476
D23 Tolima 0.233 0.046 0.092 0.064 0.046 0.102 0.418
D24 Valle 0.071 0.005 0.206 0.039 0.062 0.097 0.520
D25 Amazonas 0.182 0.000 0.012 0.011 0.051 0.315 0.429
D26 Arauca 0.263 0.376 0.008 0.040 0.022 0.118 0.172
D27 Casanare 0.088 0.750 0.008 0.050 0.015 0.019 0.070
D28 Guanía 0.179 0.063 0.013 0.093 0.053 0.246 0.353
D29 Guaviare 0.388 0.000 0.004 0.068 0.038 0.263 0.240
D30 Putumayo 0.226 0.171 0.016 0.039 0.029 0.169 0.350
D31 San Andrés y Providencia 0.032 0.000 0.007 0.009 0.117 0.088 0.747
D32 Vaupés 0.422 0.004 0.006 0.031 0.037 0.237 0.262
D33 Vichada 0.566 0.002 0.004 0.041 0.019 0.134 0.234
National 0.117 0.064 0.159 0.055 0.054 0.093 0.459  
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Table A.7. Regional Shares, by Sector 
 
AGR MNE IND CNT TRN ADP OTS TOTAL
D1 Antioquia 0.153 0.082 0.187 0.190 0.127 0.117 0.153 0.151
D2 Atlántico 0.013 0.004 0.061 0.033 0.053 0.043 0.059 0.047
D3 Bogotá D. C. 0.004 0.021 0.250 0.251 0.249 0.209 0.310 0.230
D4 Bolívar 0.033 0.014 0.071 0.024 0.035 0.054 0.029 0.038
D5 Boyacá 0.038 0.018 0.022 0.021 0.026 0.034 0.021 0.025
D6 Caldas 0.037 0.004 0.021 0.014 0.035 0.021 0.021 0.022
D7 Caquetá 0.018 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.011 0.004 0.006
D8 Cauca 0.026 0.002 0.023 0.016 0.008 0.021 0.014 0.016
D9 Cesar 0.035 0.103 0.006 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.010 0.019
D10 Córdoba 0.045 0.121 0.006 0.025 0.028 0.019 0.016 0.026
D11 Cundinamarca 0.117 0.011 0.072 0.031 0.038 0.055 0.035 0.050
D12 Chocó 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.004
D13 Huila 0.039 0.052 0.004 0.027 0.013 0.026 0.014 0.020
D14 La Guajira 0.007 0.105 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.013
D15 Magdalena 0.036 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.016
D16 Meta 0.048 0.047 0.008 0.015 0.021 0.014 0.013 0.019
D17 Nariño 0.045 0.003 0.004 0.033 0.014 0.022 0.017 0.019
D18 Norte Santander 0.022 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.022 0.038 0.018 0.018
D19 Quindío 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.018 0.010 0.009 0.008
D20 Risaralda 0.013 0.002 0.016 0.029 0.024 0.018 0.018 0.017
D21 Santander 0.063 0.021 0.077 0.075 0.064 0.053 0.046 0.055
D22 Sucre 0.019 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.010 0.008 0.008
D23 Tolima 0.048 0.018 0.014 0.028 0.021 0.027 0.022 0.024
D24 Valle 0.066 0.009 0.140 0.077 0.126 0.113 0.123 0.108
D25 Amazonas 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001
D26 Arauca 0.016 0.041 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.007
D27 Casanare 0.019 0.295 0.001 0.023 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.025
D28 Guanía 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
D29 Guaviare 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001
D30 Putumayo 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.003
D31 San Andrés y Providencia 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.003
D32 Vaupés 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
D33 Vichada 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001
National 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
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Appendix 2. The CGE Core Equations 
 
 
The functional forms of the main groups of equations of the spatial CGE core are presented 
in this Appendix together with the definition of the main groups of variables, parameters 
and coefficients. 
 
The notational convention uses uppercase letters to represent the levels of the variables and 
lowercase for their percentage-change representation. Superscripts (u), u = 0, 1j, 2j, 3, 4, 5, 
6, refer, respectively, to output (0) and to the six different regional-specific users of the 
products identified in the model: producers in sector j  (1j), investors in sector j  (2j), 
households  (3), purchasers of exports (4), regional governments (5) and the Central 
government (6); the second superscript identifies the domestic region where the user is 
located. Inputs are identified by two subscripts: the first takes the values 1, ..., g, for 
commodities, g + 1, for primary factors, and g + 2, for “other costs” (basically, taxes and 
subsidies on production); the second subscript identifies the source of the input, being it 
from domestic region b (1b) or imported (2), or coming from labor (1), capital (2) or land 
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(A6) Composition of output by industries 
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(A8) Purchasers’ prices related to basic prices, margins (transportation costs) and taxes 
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(A9) Foreign demands (exports) for domestic goods 
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(A10) Regional government demands 
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(A13) Demand equals supply for regional domestic commodities 
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(A14) Regional industry revenue equals industry costs 
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(A15) Basic price of imported commodities 
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(A16) Cost of constructing units of capital for regional industries 
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(A17) Investment behavior 
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(A18) Capital stock in period T+1 – comparative statics 
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 (A19) Definition of rates of return to capital 
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(A20) Relation between capital growth and rates of return 
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Other definitions in the CGE core include: revenue from indirect taxes, import volume of 
commodities, components of regional/national GDP, regional/national price indices, wage 
settings, definitions of factor prices, and employment aggregates. 
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Variables 
 
Variable Index  ranges  Description 
Demand by user (u) in region r for good or 








(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and  
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1,…,h;  
if (u) = (1j)  then i = 1,…,g + 2; 
if (u) ≠ (1j) then i = 1,…,g; 
s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q; and i = 1,…,g and 
s = 1, 2, 3 for i = g+1 






) (   (u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and  
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1,…,h;  
if (u) = (1j)  then i = 1,…,g + 2; 
if (u) ≠ (1j) then i = 1,…,g; 
s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q; and i = 1,…,g and 
s = 1, 2, 3 for i = g+1 
r = 1,…,R 
 
Price paid by user (u) in region r for good or 




) ( •   (u) = (3) and (kj) for k = 1, 2 and 
 j = 1, …,h. 
if (u) = (1j) then i = 1, …,g + 1;              
if (u) ≠ (1j) then i = 1, …,g 
r = 1,…,R 
 
Demand for composite good or primary factor i 




) , 1 ( +   j = 1, …,h and s = 1, 2, 3 
r = 1,…,R 
 






) (   i = 1,...,g, (u) = (3) and (kj) for k = 1, 2 
and j = 1,..., h 
r = 1,…,R 
 
Technical change related to the use of good i by 
user (u) in region r 
r C     Total expenditure by regional household in 
region r 
 
r Q    Number  of  households 
 
r u z
) (   (u) = (kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …,h 
r = 1,…,R 
Activity levels: current production and 





) (   i = 1, …,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …,q 
r = 1,…,R 
  






) (   i = 1, …,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …,q 
r = 1,…,R 
  
Shift (price) in foreign demand curves for 
regional exports 
 





) 1 (   m, i = 1,…,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q 
(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and  
(kj) for k = 1, 2  and j = 1, …,h 
Demand for commodity (m1) to be used as a 
margin to facilitate the flow of (is) to (u) in 
region r Trade Liberalization in Colombia 
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Variable Index  ranges  Description 






) 1 (   m, i = 1,…,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q 
(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and  
(kj) for k = 1, 2  and j = 1, …,h 
r = 1,…,R 
 
Technical change related to the demand for 
commodity (m1) to be used as a margin to 





) 1 (   i = 1,…,g;  j = 1,…,h 
r = 1,...,R 
 





) (   i = 1,…,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q 
r = 1,...,R 
 
Basic price of good i in region r from source s  
) (
)) 2 ( (
w
i p   i = 1,…,g 
 
USD c.i.f. price of imported commodity i 
 
) 0 (
)) 2 ( (i t   i = 1,…,g  Power of the tariff on imports of i 
 
) ) ( , , , ( r u s i t τ
 
i = 1,…,g;τ = 1,…,t;  
s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q 
(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6)  
and (kj) for k = 1, 2 and  j = 1,…,h 
r = 1,...,R 
 
Power of the tax τ  on sales of commodity (is) 




) (   j = 1,…,h 
r = 1,...,R 
 
Regional-industry-specific capital shift terms 
 
r
k f ) (   r = 1,...,R 
 




) 2 , 1 (
r j
g x +   j = 1,…, h 
r = 1,...,R 
Capital stock in industry j in region r at the end 
of the year, i.e., capital stock available for use 





) (   j = 1,…, h 
r = 1,...,R 
Cost of constructing a unit of capital for 
industry j in region r 
 
) (τ f   τ = 1,…,t  Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes 
in the power of tax τ  
 
) ( i f τ   τ = 1,…,t; 
i = 1, …,g 
Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes 





i f τ   τ = 1,…,t; 
(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and  
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and  j = 1, …, h 
Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes 






) (τ   τ = 1,…,t; 
(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and  
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and  j = 1, …, h 
r = 1,…,R 
 
Shift term allowing uniform percentage changes 
in the power of tax τ of commodity i on user 





) (   i = 1, …,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q 
r = 1,…,R 
Commodity and source-specific shift term for 
regional government expenditures in region r 
 
r f
) 5 (   r = 1,…,R  Shift term for regional government expenditures Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 
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Variable Index  ranges  Description 
in region r 
 





) (   i = 1, …,g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1,…,q 
r = 1,…,R 
Commodity and source-specific shift term for 
Central government expenditures in region r 
 
r f
) 6 (   r = 1,…,R  Shift term for Central government expenditures 
in region r 
 
) 6 ( f     Shift term for Central government expenditures 
 
ω     Overall rate of return on capital (short-run) 
 
r
j r ) (   j = 1,...,h 
r = 1,…,R 
 
Regional-industry-specific rate of return  
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) ( σ   Parameter: elasticity of substitution between alternative sources of commodity or factor i 
for user (u) in region r 
 
r j) 0 ( σ   Parameter: elasticity of transformation between outputs of different commodities in 





) , 1 ( + α   Parameter: returns to scale to individual primary factors in industry j in region r 
r








j) ( ε   Parameter: sensitivity of capital growth to rates of return of industry j in region r 
 
r





) ( θ   Parameter: scale economies to transportation of commodity (i) produced in region r 





) ( • μ   Parameter: returns to scale to primary factors (i = g+1 and u = 1j); otherwise,  1
) (
) ( = •
r u
i μ  
 
) ), ( , , ( r u s i B   Input-output flow: basic value of (is) used by (u) in region r 
 
), ( , , , ( r u s i m M
 
Input-output flow: basic value of domestic good m used as a margin to facilitate the flow 
of (is) to (u) in region r 
 
) ), ( , , , ( r u s i T τ
 
Input-output flow: collection of tax τ  on the sale of (is) to (u) in region r 
 
) ), ( , , ( r u s i V   Input-output flow: purchasers’ value of good or factor i from source s used by user (u) in 
region r 
 
) , , ( r j i Y   Input-output flow: basic value of output of domestic good i by industry j from region r 
 
r
j Q ) (   Coefficient: ratio, gross to net rate of return 
 Trade Liberalization in Colomibia 
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G  Set: {1,2, …, g}, g is the number of composite goods 
G*  Set: {1,2, …, g+1}, g+1 is the number of composite goods and primary factors 
H  Set: {1,2, …, h}, h is the number of industries 
U  Set: {(3), (4), (5), (6), (k j) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h} 
U*  Set: {(3), (k j) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h} 
S  Set: {1, 2, …, r+1}, r+1 is the number of regions (including foreign) 
S*  Set: {1, 2, …,r}, r is the number of domestic regions 
T  Set: {1, …, t}, t is the number of indirect taxes 
 
 
 